



Patronage Politics as a Failure of Governance in Papua New Guinea

Betty Wakia

Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan

Corresponding Author: Betty Wakia bwakia@gmail.com

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords: Patronage Politics, Clientelism, Governance, PNG

Received : 1 September

Revised : 17 October

Accepted: 23 November

©2024 Wakia: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).



ABSTRACT

Papua New Guineans use the word "kaikaimanism" to characterize a political system whereby goods or services are exchanged for political backing, perhaps including an either explicit or implicit quid pro quo. It often involves behaviors driven by self-interest or the anticipation of return. The purpose of this article is to investigate the variables that contribute to the kaikaimanist approach to politics, which has such a negative influence on PNG's political and economic performance. The most likely explanation for the rise and persistence of patron-client politics is that voters are ignorant about the potential outcomes of their votes and the range of political options available to them. A further aspect that contributes to the perpetuation of this impression is the ongoing decline of institutions, such as those in charge of peace and order, which has led to the idea that better political choices are not accessible

INTRODUCTION

For a tiny democratic nation that is still in the process of evolving, such as PNG, *kaikaimanism* will eventually emerge within the democratic system itself. Government patronage is a major source of influence for political parties in PNG. For most individuals in PNG, engaging in politics, whether as a client or an attendant, remains the most effective means of advancing in society (Wakia, 2024). It is of the utmost importance from a *Kaikaimanism* perspective to understand how the democratic political system in PNG operates. A hybrid of democratic principles and *kaikaimanism* has given rise to patronage democracy in PNG (Wakia, 2024). PNG has faced enormous difficulties during the democratic transition. One of the factors contributing to the deterioration of the political system is the emergence of *kaikaimanism* in its operations (Wakia, 2024).

Nonetheless, *kaikaimanism* is an integral part of PNG's democratic political system, which allows it to remain one of the few developing countries that can maintain democracy. The patronage democracy of PNG is characterized by politicians using their power to provide special favors to supporters; government employees trading privileges at will; and voters exchanging votes for favors. While Papua New Guinean politicians, voters, and officials all act rationally, the *Kaikai Man* politics in PNG have had many negative effects, including a decline in national capabilities, a loss of trust in the government, and issues with its overall quality. Politics characterized by *kaikaimanism* is obviously corrupt and runs counter to democratic ideals (Wakia, 2024). PNG and similar countries do not exhibit democratic formation.

According to conventional governance indicators, the World Bank (2016b) reports that PNG has the poorest governance, but the quality of governance in the country is slowly but surely improving. According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's 2017 report, PNG was the Pacific region's third-largest beneficiary of assistance from donors for the period of time spanning from 2000 to 2015. Anyone who has spent even a short amount of time in PNG will have seen how problems with the government contribute to the poverty that exists in the country. The administration of PNG neglects vital infrastructure. Bureaucracies that function poorly hinder legitimate firms and permit other enterprises to inflict harm. There is a serious lack of leadership in the healthcare and school sectors. This is obviously true. Most people overlook the role of PNG's politics in influencing governmental matters.

As I show in this article, many of the problems with PNG's government stem from *kaikaimanist* politics. Many people believe that the election process creates political instability, which is the root cause of PNG's governance problems. The method of voting in *Kaikaimanist* politics is such that citizens do not choose leaders capable of implementing effective policies. Based on their assessments, they selected candidates who they believed might have an immediate impact if elected. Consequently, the selection and financial motivation of members of parliament prioritize the short-term gain of their constituents over the long-term management of the national government. Some people, like *Kaikai Man*, are fighting for more decentralized benefits rather than

better government. In PNG, *kaikaimanism* is a popular political philosophy. Most voters look for local or personal benefits when they cast their votes, but most politicians put the needs of their followers ahead of those of the country as a whole.

In the last ten years, there has been a proliferation of studies on *kaikaimanism* on a global scale. It is possible that the association between *kaikaimanism* and weak administration is one of the factors that has contributed to the resurgence of interest in *kaikaimanism* (Hicken, 2011, pp. 302–303). However, *kaikaimanism* in PNG and its influence on the government have received little attention up to this point. The works of Cox (2009), Haque (2012), and Kurer (2007) are three significant outliers to this rule. Duncan and Hassall's (2011) examination of *kaikaimanism* throughout the Pacific is quite helpful. This article builds on previous research by linking *kaikaimanism* and PNG's governance challenges. The article defines *kaikaimanism* and demonstrates how PNG aligns with its characteristics. Following this, it provides an overview of the repercussions of *kaikaimanism*, with a particular emphasis on the connection between *kaikaimanism* and weak governance.

The article achieves this by drawing on both global research and PNG-based cases. Next, the article delves into the factors and causes that contribute to *Kaikaimanism*. In doing so, the study exposes a paradox: while underdevelopment and poor governance are known to be causes of *kaikaimanism*, they are also known to be consequences of the phenomenon itself. Given that *kaikaimanism* is both a cause and a consequence of governance as well as a development issue in PNG, its removal will not be a straightforward process. However, there is reason for optimism in the fact that, throughout history, other nations have successfully transitioned from *kaikaimanist* politics to issues-based programmatic politics, despite the fact that this transition has not been an easy one. In the final section of the study, I examine the implications that *kaikaimanism* has for PNG's public assistance program.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study will use the *Kaikaimanism* analysis method to gain a better understanding of the patron-client matrix. This will provide a framework for the research. This study investigates the functioning of *kaikaimanism*, an essential part of electoral and distributive politics in emerging democracies. In order to avoid conceptual stretching, make good theoretical arguments, and allow the right empirical research, it is important to define the definitional aspects of *kaikaimanism* and set it apart from other types of distributive politics. This will allow for a proper study of *Kaikaimanism*.

For the purposes of this article, the word "*kaikaimanism*" refers to the practice of political parties giving people special and tailored benefits in exchange for the individuals' support in the election process. The cultural explanations of *kaikaimanism* are crucial in the sense that cultural factors or qualities have the power to shape and effect the expectations of the participants

who are engaging in the interaction. This is why Kaikaimanism's cultural explanations hold significant relevance.

One of the most notable examples of using cultural explanations to explain the predominance of kaikaimanism in a particular country or place is the series of studies carried out on the North-South split in Italian politics, culture, and economy. These studies were undertaken in Italy. Some of the main features of Kaikaimanism are that the benefits depend on certain events happening; secondly, the rules for giving them out are unclear and not made public; thirdly, the criteria for giving Kaikaimanism benefits are different from those for programmatic benefits, which are made public, formalised, and followed by impartial public officials; and finally, the benefits are tailored to specific people or members of specific parties and can't be taken into account.

Kaikaimanism's conceptual and analytical framework, which has its roots in anthropology, is accessible to a wide variety of people based on their level of accessibility. On the other hand, James C. Scott's argument in his book 'Patron-Client Politics' and 'Political Change in Southeast Asia' stands out as being very straight forward and does not include any ambiguity. From the point of view of dyadic relationships, which are characterised by instrumental friendship and include two people, Scott argues that the patron-client connection is one-of-a-kind and extraordinary. According to Scott (1972:92), a relationship of this kind is one in which a person with a higher social and economic standing (the patron) makes use of his authority and resources to assist another person with a lower status (the client), and the client, in turn, provides the patron with general support, financial assistance, and can even provide personal service. In PNG, political patrons play a significant part in the nation's politics by offering financial support to candidates for public office. This contributes to the nation's political climate. As a result, these politicians prioritise the needs of their followers over the needs of the entire community. .

What is Kaikaimanism?

The Tok Pisin term "kaikaimanism" or "kaikai man" describes the practice of appropriating goods and services for one's own gain at the expense of others. The tenet of reciprocity, wherein one party offers assistance to another in hope of receiving some kind of gain in return, is central to the Kaikai Man system. People from PNG commonly use this system to discuss potential actions. Compared to the selected leader, the Kaikai Man has significantly more power. Because the leader is reluctant to give up his ostentatious lifestyle for a more modest one, he asks the Kaikai Man how high the jump is. When it comes to making sure the leader is reliant on him, the Kaikai Man is an expert. Corruption and fraud have allowed PNG's political scene to successfully sidestep the system. The Kaikai Man is wasting our country's resources and making it harder for average people to have equal opportunity. For PNG, Kaikai Man represents a major challenge. It promotes an egocentric and slothful strategy for reaching one's financial goals. Many blame the Kaikai Man and cronyism in politics for the disintegration of law and order.

Kaikaimanism has gained widespread recognition in PNG during election years as voters and politicians engage in particularistic rent-seeking. This involves pursuing small group or individual advantages by bypassing due process in order to achieve their goals. PNG primarily bases its election processes on kaikaimanism and designs them methodically. Kaikaimanism, as a framework for social interactions, may be characterised by a variety of notions, depending on the connection's underlying themes. The wide variety of origins and foundations of these interactions reveals a state of conceptual chaos in relation to these emergent notions. Kaikaimanism is a political system characterised by the exchange of commodities or services for political support. In reality, politicians or political parties provide concrete advantages, such as employment opportunities, agreements, or services, in exchange for votes, campaign assistance, or other types of political support. This reciprocal system often undermines democratic norms, promoting a culture of politics centred on transactions rather than talent. Regardless of their assumption of power or democratic election, Papua New Guinean leaders rely on providing personal benefits to specific individuals within the voting population in exchange for ongoing political support. This finding is based on the underlying premise that voters in PNG consistently have a much greater inclination towards private transfers compared to public products or initiatives that benefit the whole country.

Throughout a significant portion of PNG, the prevalence of kaikaimanism in the public administration is extensive. This implies that the selection of bureaucrats handling critical aspects of national life, like health, education, and the economy, frequently hinges on their political prominence rather than their professional proficiency. Kaikaimanism, to put it simply, fosters a favourable environment for corrupt activities. Knowing that higher-ranking individuals within the system will protect them may motivate public officials at various levels of government to take bribes or embezzle public funds. Discovering a balanced and genuine system of checks is unusual. Kaikaimanism is closely related to corruption because it has the potential to establish an implicit agreement of collusion across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The absence of professionalism in the public sector and the lack of openness in the distribution of public positions are further contributing factors to the intricate symptoms of the problem.

Like many social phenomena, there is no commonly accepted definition of kaikaimanism. This post, which emphasises engaging with contemporary political science literature, bases its definition on terminology from recent political science research. In this article, Kaikaimanism's key distinguishing characteristics are dependent trade and particularism. In a democratic system, contingent exchange refers to the process by which voters provide electoral support to politicians in exchange for tangible advantages. Voters' support depends on their anticipation or receipt of benefits from candidates and officials. Candidates and politicians gain or anticipate earning benefits based on the votes they obtain from people (Hicken, 2011, pp. 290-294; Stokes, 2009, pp. 648-649). Merely relying on voters who vote with the intention of receiving

monetary rewards is insufficient to establish *kaikaimanism*. Particularism is essential (Hicken, 2011; Stokes, 2009). *Kaikaimanist* politics revolves around transactions, in which the advantages given to voters are mostly exclusive. When compared to the implementation of a policy that benefits both members of the party and those who do not support it, or the allocation of funds to an entire electoral district that benefits both voters and those who do not, the benefits of particularistic exchange are only accrued to the voter, their immediate family, or a comparable group.

Kaikaimanism is often associated with the practice of vote buying, which involves the direct exchange of payment for votes in advance (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). Although this combination makes sense, Hicken (2011, p. 296) notes that in order for vote-buying to meet the contingent exchange criterion, the politician handing out the cash must truly believe that it will secure the support of individual voters in exchange for cash, not just use it to show how competitive they are as a candidate. *Kaikaimanism* often entails candidates using intermediaries, referred to as "brokers" in academic literature, who are primarily responsible for distributing resources, securing votes, and ensuring that voters fulfil their end of the electoral agreement (Aspinall, 2013; Stokes et al., 2013). Therefore, voters who prioritise specific advantages will need to endorse politicians whose acts contravene the norms and regulations of public service. One of the distinctive characteristics of PNG politics is the exertion of pressure by voters. Voters can still value general benefits such as education, health, infrastructure services, personal security, and welfare payments, even if they are also seeking specific benefits. Welfare payments, for example, are considered general benefits because they are available to all members of society with specific characteristics.

According to Brown (1989:249) and Sillitoe (1983:201), "development" includes the provision of public services in the fields of healthcare, education, infrastructure (including electricity, transportation, and roads), and agricultural extension. According to recent surveys, 'development' is something in which Papua New Guineans are quite interested. *Kaikaimanism's* defining characteristic is a strong tendency to actively pursue certain benefits. Both collective and individual forms of this benefit exist, including government contracts, feast funds, bride prices, travel expenses, opportunities for public service jobs, and personal or business credit (see Gibbs 2004:9; Dorney 1998:23). In terms of PNG, these benefits include both group and individual gains. The idea of "government" and the provision of these specific advantages glaringly contradict each other; traditional means cannot provide these benefits.

An important contention is that the *kaikaimanism* paradigm, which focuses on maximising benefits, provides a viable explanation for voting behavior. Given the advice, this aligns with the current circumstances. While voters have shown apathy towards general policy matters, the influence of specific incentives in the political decision-making process has contributed to this trend. Both of these variables have played a significant role in bringing about the current situation. This behaviour shows a disregard for the existing political and administrative structures, and it weakens these processes. Hence,

it is possible to accurately characterise this behaviour as predatory rent-seeking. Consequently, this activity has an adverse effect on the health and well-being of all participants, which is an unintentional outcome. There is a strong consensus on the notion that political power and personal wealth are the primary motivators for politicians. Current events serve as the foundation for this assumption. By taking advantage of this opportunity, I would like to emphasise a few key points. According to Sillitoe (1983:202), politicians anticipate receiving personal benefits that exceed the official pay associated with their careers. Some of these advantages are unrelated to their specific jobs. Hegarty (1979:199) asserts that politicians have consistently made use of the privileges that come with their positions ever since the country attained its independence. They do this by procuring loans and contracts from the government and serving as middlemen for foreign-based enterprises. This is a long-standing issue. The evidence substantiates the theory, drawing from recent real-life occurrences.

Individuals are inclined to endorse politicians who have a higher likelihood of winning elections and hold key government positions. By adhering to the *kaikaimanism* paradigm, politicians are able to allocate resources towards their supporters, which suggests that people are more inclined to back elected officials who possess these attributes. Moreover, the model suggests that individuals are more likely to endorse politicians who, once elected, fulfil the commitments they made to carry out their duties. It is the responsibility of the candidates to convince the voters that they are qualified, have substantial support, have a substantial chance of winning, will be able to access government resources if elected, and will fulfill their duties. Voters choose candidates who have these attributes. Formerly elected politicians, often ministers, tend to lose connection with the constituents who voted for them because of their past performance. This outcome is clearly a direct consequence of their previous performance. Individuals often gravitate towards candidates who are more likely to succeed in the competitive realm of politics in PNG when government institutions do not provide assessments to potential applicants. The determining elements in voting choices generally revolve around the candidates' personalities and their aptitude for leadership.

Education is crucial, yet those who lack access or suffer from illness may encounter challenges in their academic endeavors. Block voting, or the practice of supporting local candidates, aims to address the challenge of selecting a candidate who not only satisfies the implicit agreement but also successfully performs in government. Possessing leadership skills and education enhances the chances of winning an election and securing a government position. However, the tradition of preferring local candidates helps to solve the problem of picking a candidate who can successfully deliver once in office. Once elected, members of Parliament often display opportunistic behaviour, especially when their chances of re-election are uncertain. PNG voters have a tendency to select leaders who have social connections with them, often members of the same clan or village (Gibbs, 2004:8). This is due to the aforementioned beliefs. As a result, these candidates face more difficulty changing their political affiliations due to

the potential societal repercussions if they fail to meet the established standards.

Kaikaimanism's concepts suggest that people do not view politicians' involvement in corrupt activities or personal enrichment as disqualifying factors. Voters base their selection only on the overall number of benefits provided. Politicians, embroiled in corruption scandals and directly benefiting from their actions, continue to endorse the ideals of the Kaikai man. By incorporating transaction costs into the Kaikaimanism model, we can explain the phenomenon where multiple groups nominate candidates, yet only one emerges victorious, garnering a minor share of the total vote. This provides a rationale for the observed phenomenon. This tendency can be attributed to the groupings' lack of cooperation, which hinders their ability to endorse candidates with comparable characteristics, thereby increasing their chances of adequate representation. When delayed exchanges encourage opportunistic behaviour, contractual agreements are inherently flawed in their design, and there is no accessible or cost-effective enforcement mechanism, cooperation may not occur, even though it is theoretically possible to lead to mutual benefits. It is highly unlikely for a significant number of parties to reach a consensus on candidates in situations where individuals from diverse factions have previously collaborated or engaged in conflict, as commonly observed in various areas of PNG. The fragmentation of the vote, where even little alterations may greatly influence the election's result, is an additional aspect that contributes to the uncertainty of politicians' tenure as they strive to fulfil their commitments to their followers. Given the significant incentives to violate unspoken agreements in this scenario, it is evident why voters want to safeguard themselves against potential betrayal by supporting politicians who align with their own faction.

The political conduct of party leaders and voters is the decisive factor in shaping the structure of the party organization. Due to their exclusive focus on pursuing financial gains and their resistance to broader policy orientations, political parties transform into rent-seeking entities. This is because the members of these parties depend on them to gain access to the state's resources. Parties are ephemeral collectives centred on a leader, and they disintegrate rapidly if the leader fails to fulfil their commitments. This is because there is no other governing concept that provides parties with cohesion. One notable feature of PNG's political system is the presence of several volatile parties, a result of the inherent factionalism within these fragile personal groups. On the other hand, the party organisation is responsible for voters' apathy towards the candidates' party affiliation. If a candidate's party affiliation influences the likelihood of getting benefits and services, then a voter's consideration of that affiliation becomes a determining factor in their decision-making process. This situation benefits candidates affiliated with a political party expected to assume power after the election because it enhances their position. Due to the volatile nature of government formation in PNG, party affiliation has never served as a dependable predictor of future benefits. According to the Kaikai Man script, people have consistently shown disinterest in candidates' political party

affiliations since independence. This has been the prevailing situation for the entire era following independence.

Kaikai man rent-seeking is a prevalent phenomenon in PNG's political process. When politicians seek to provide specific benefits to their supporters in exchange for political backing, a tendency known as *kaikaimanism* emerges. Consequently, the outcome is a highly dynamic and inherently volatile political system characterised by feeble political parties, individualised and localised politics, and intense political competition across the system. The majority of individuals agree that patronage politics has had a negative impact on governance and economic advancement, as well as on the material well-being of voters. This prompts an inquiry as to why voters engage in such detrimental activity, which seems to contradict their long-term financial interests. If you want an explanation for the emergence and enduring dominance of *kaikaimanism* in political life, the most obvious source to consult would be the literature pertaining to PNG's culture. May (1997:45) describes the trait of "personal and group politics" as a defining aspect of politics in contemporary PNG, even at the national level. The country's political culture deeply ingrains this particular style. Clan, local, or ethnic divides have dominated political allegiance, leading to an increase in nepotism (May 1997:46). At this level of analysis, rent-seeking by corrupt individuals is just a part of the overall political culture.

The interpretation of voting behaviour entails the relationship between government and society. It is widely believed that indigenous social systems have deeply influenced the government at all levels (Morgan 2005:4). More specifically, it is considered that the introduction of the "big man" influence and the practice of exchanging presents had a significant and negative effect on state bureaucracy, leading to their corruption and dysfunction (Dinnen 2001:191). By allocating subsidies, implementing development projects, providing infrastructure services, and distributing other resources to constituents via individualised interactions, the political leader may cultivate a reputation and attract a loyal following. The act of bestowing gifts by the government has transformed into a strategy for asserting political dominance, especially in the realm of elections. The integration of a big-man leadership style into the Melanesian gift economy has a detrimental effect on the integrity and effectiveness of governmental institutions (Dinnen 2001:191). Hence, it is important to provide a comprehensive explanation of the mechanisms used by these influential individuals to rally people through the strategic use of particularistic political tactics. The dominance of power and influence, along with the practice of exchanging gifts, may explain this phenomenon.

METHODOLOGY

Kaikaimanism and Corruption

To what degree does this kaikaimanism system include characteristics of corruption? It is common for this term to cause confusion. Electoral patronage, defined as the method by which an elected official obtains the allegiance of an individual, group, or organisation in exchange for a favour, is not considered illegal. The objective of this attempt is to establish a long-term relationship based on mutual recognition. It is crucial to conceptualise kaikaimanism as a system where favours are exchanged for electoral votes and political corruption as a kind of bartering, which involves selling political decisions for financial profit. Kaikaimanism is not considered a criminal activity due to its obscurity and susceptibility to corruption. The level of intricacy is significant.

Because most economic research defines corruption as the improper use of public office for personal benefit, it follows that the majority of transactions involving the exchange of votes (often referred to as "vote buying") are inherently corrupt. This is due to the frequent use of public money or services to provide political support, which benefits the politician in a personal capacity. Some instances of misuse may not explicitly involve monetary transactions but instead manifest as collusive corruption. This type of corruption occurs when a politician manipulates an official into disregarding rule violations committed by certain individuals within their local constituency, such as building codes or zoning restrictions. It can also involve the politician facilitating their own access to unauthorised connections for electricity or water or directing government procurement towards expensive local sources within their constituency.

In general, it is fair to expect that the act of purchasing votes will contribute to the establishment and acceptance of corruption inside the system. The counterfactual is the decisive element in assessing the impact of vote-buying on corruption, and it is self-evident. Consider two distinct political systems, each marked by affluent entrepreneurs who want politicians to reduce constraints (such as environmental rules) that negatively impact their profits. In a particular system, individuals are required to make tax contributions. By appropriately allocating public money, a politician who favours corporate interests may strategically secure the support of economically disadvantaged individuals in order to secure electoral victories and implement policies aligned with the preferences of business leaders. Under the previous system, companies made financial contributions to the politician's campaign fund. The politician then uses these donations to inundate television or social media platforms with political advertisements in an attempt to persuade others to vote for them. While the second scenario does not involve corrupt practices, the first one does. Influence peddling, or the practice of trading influence or lobbying for the sale of regulations, has become the predominant type of corruption, surpassing bribery in prevalence.

According to James C. Scott (1985), a political scientist, it is important to distinguish between market corruption and parochial corruption, sometimes referred to as local corruption. Jean-François Médard, on the other hand, chooses to refer to the concepts of "exchange-social corruption" and "exchange-economic corruption" instead of using the phrase "shaky friendship

relationship" as described by Julian A. Pitt-Rivers (1954: 140). Médard's decision is based on his conviction that these phrases effectively convey the intended meaning of the sentence. The objective of each of these words is to distinguish between the different levels of corruption. For example, they may include power structures that rely on a chosen leader's sway, charisma, and connections, as well as those that include financial dealings deemed morally questionable. Furthermore, by using these idioms, we can emphasise the formation of individual connections and inter-dependencies.

To accurately describe *kaikaimanism*, a thorough definition of the term is required, including both the financial donation aspect and the deceitful manipulation of election procedures. In contemporary society, the general public and the media use this word in a pejorative manner. The term frequently refers to self-interested relationships and unjustifiable favours bestowed upon an individual in exchange for political support. Despite its discredit, the notion of *kaikaimanism* persists in many aspects of everyday life, often associated with corrupt acts and perceived as a contradiction to the principle of equal opportunity.

Governance Challenges in Papua New Guinea

In PNG, engaging in politics is an expensive undertaking, especially considering that democracy has failed to provide its desired outcomes for the welfare of the population. Despite PNG's long-standing democratic governance, its citizens persist in using water from polluted wells infested with frogs. A significant number of roads are impassable for motor vehicles, and the bulk of medical services are beyond the reach of the typical individual. Consequently, the voters insist on having control over the construction of bridges, roads, and other types of public facilities. As a result, other politicians have pledged to do the same, but none have been able to keep their pledges. Regarding the current political situation in PNG, citizens prioritise financial gain over returning favours. Therefore, the substantial expenditure required to engage in politics necessitates that both newcomers and current officeholders in the political arena prepare to allocate a significant sum of money towards achieving their respective objectives. Financial institutions or individuals like friends, family, or business associates can provide a loan. We carry out the entire process with the expectation that the candidate, once in government, will recover and return the funds. The biggest worry about elections in PNG is the candidates' financial resources. Given the exorbitant expenses associated with the political process, only those who possess significant money or have strong financial support from affluent donors are capable of pursuing political office.

Most analysts are concerned that political instability is the primary challenge afflicting PNG's politics. Various attributes may serve as either the cause or the expression of political instability. The presence of several autonomous members of parliament (MPs) who align themselves with the government that offers them the most financial incentives is a key component in the development of parliamentary politics. The multitude of political parties represented in parliament also fulfils that function. Gelu (2005:91) highlights the absence of party discipline, frequent party-switching by members of

parliament, and the occurrence of party sections simultaneously serving in both the government and opposition. Parties are personalised means of attaining and distributing power, characterised by modest variations in policies. According to Standish (1999:5), these divisions persist as groups within the national parliament, led by a single leader. The brief tenures of a significant proportion of parliament members led to the ousting of about half of them in the elections preceding 2002, resulting in an exceptional turnover rate of 70.6%.

Votes of no confidence, either directly or indirectly, have removed every elected Prime Minister from office since the country's independence. The only exception to this rule is the current ministry of Marape, which has remained in power for the whole of the country's history. Out of all the instances of political instability that have really taken place, the votes of no confidence are the most astonishing and shocking ones. Therefore, those in positions of responsibility within the government dedicate a significant portion of their time and attention to protecting themselves from the threats posed by votes of no confidence. The acquisition of support through the allocation and reallocation of lucrative government employment achieves this aim (Dorney, 1998: 22). This approach accomplishes this goal effectively.

The current discussion is about a similar election process to the legislative procedure mentioned before. The first-past-the-post system conducted elections from 1975 to 2002. According to Fraenkel (2004):123, the number of candidates and parties involved in the elections has steadily increased and has been quite substantial. Recent electoral events have witnessed this increase. The election process has been characterised by the prevalence of block voting, a voting system in which rival clans and villages prioritise their own candidates, and voters often show their support for candidates from their local area (Burton, 1989:261; Saffu, 1989:15). Block voting has been the prevailing voting technique in most elections. Fraenkel (2004):123 asserts that a minuscule fraction of the overall votes determines the winners, despite the wide distribution of votes. The high number of candidates who have tribal backing contributes to increased voter turnout. Conversely, the lack of loyalty that parliament members exhibit towards their respective parties is indicative of the disinterest that people have towards political parties and party politics. The electoral system's fragmentation poses a challenge to making accurate forecasts of the parties that would form the government, even post-election. This is due to the fact that coalitions involving a substantial number of participants and extensive deliberations are necessary for the establishment of governments. This is because party leaders must convene their factions in distant locations to prevent defections and attract potential followers. There is a consensus among many people that this instability has significantly contributed to the lack of stability, continuity, and planning in PNG's policies. Furthermore, it is widely believed that this instability is one of the main causes of PNG's economic downturn (Reilly, 2002a:705-708). A significant number of people have agreed to this consensus.

Throughout history, people have viewed *kaikaimanism* as an expression of incomplete modernity that a democratic process would rectify. During the first years after PNG's independence, there were signs of political nepotism in the nation. This system was characterised by an oligarchy, where a select group of political elites held power and made political decisions on behalf of the population. However, the extent to which these leaders demonstrated their own belief systems and ethical values was quite small. In the present day, the circumstances have significantly diverged from the past, whereby political elites and influential individuals governed the decision-making process, allocated resources, and wielded power in an unfair way, as stated by Luis (2008). The current condition has led to the emergence of externalities in contemporary political institutions, jeopardising public accountability and transparency. Given this, we view political *kaikaimanism* as detrimental to the advancement of good governance, the promotion of a free, fair, and equal society with equitable access to public resources, the establishment of a robust democratic social and economic framework, and the integration of a modern society that values peace, harmony, and public confidence in democratically elected leaders.

The presence of political *kaikaimanism* in PNG has endangered the nation's good governance. Given this, it is crucial to prioritise the pursuit of good governance to effectively promote robust governance and nation-building objectives. To achieve excellent governance, PNG must undertake the following tasks, among others. Moreover, it is crucial to reduce the focus on people and instead prioritise the development of the nation's institutions. Ensuring meritocracy and preventing favouritism and nepotism should be of utmost importance in the process of selecting individuals for public sector employment. Instead, meritocracy should serve as the ruling principle. Furthermore, it's crucial to set limits on the framework's requirements. The framework tends to limit consumers' capacity to exert their influence for a prolonged period without encountering any hindrances.

Features of *Kaikaimanism* in Papua New Guinea Political Parties

Based on the current information available, *kaikaimanism* exhibits the characteristics outlined in the following list: *Kaikaimanism* focuses primarily on the welfare of the urban underprivileged population as well as the middle class, which is committed to the philosophy. This particular topic serves as the central focus of the philosophical movement. The philosophical movement specifically singles out these individuals due to their larger population size, higher risk aversion, and better cost-effectiveness compared to other categories. Hence, it is unsurprising that civilisations characterised by high levels of inequality and low wages often see the emergence of political parties led by dominant men. Therefore, observing these encounters is not unexpected. Certain factors exist in PNG, characterised by significant economic disparity and persistent poverty, that are conducive to the emergence of *kaikaimanism*. Political parties in PNG are using financial contributions from affluent backers to gain the support of others who are less privileged than themselves. It is unsurprising that the Pangu party has strong support from the business sector, given the close

connections that dominant parties usually have with important social groupings. These organisations include wealthy businesses, the clergy, and trade unions, among other entities. Under such conditions, political parties in PNG have been seen to participate in commercial dealings with enterprises, notably those involved in the construction industry. Additionally, they have been known to engage in the illicit exchange of bribes. In addition, they have applied pressure on specialised companies to acquire media organisations that can maintain their impartiality while reporting on political matters.

The Kaikaimanism political party in PNG is characterised by several distinct features, the second of which is the distribution of work among its patrons. Members who are considered patrons include the party, the leader, the provincial government, charitable organisations, religious groups, and corporations that are loyal to the party. The division of labour processes accomplishes two fundamental goals. First, it prohibits the monopolisation of Kaikai Man resources. This confers a considerable benefit. Another advantage is that it enhances the efficacy of monitoring those who are contemplating voting. Unlike PNG, leaders, not brokers, facilitate Kaikaimanism. Based on our observations, we have concluded that the party brokers are responsible for arranging meetings, conducting home visits, keeping the party informed about developments in their assigned area, and providing care for the individuals assigned to them, regardless of their age or disability. By behaving in this way, brokers ensure the ongoing existence of the party organisation and the occurrence of events. Despite their essential role, party brokers cannot establish their own autonomous authority at any moment. Furthermore, the party's leadership does not need their services to carry out their present responsibilities. The absence of important intermediaries enhances the party's ability to maintain cohesiveness under the leadership of a notable individual. Kaikaimanism is a versatile technique that can effectively address and resolve problems in a wide range of contexts. Meeting key requirements is a method of fulfilling the expectations set by the welfare state. Kaikaimanism serves as a technique to provide satisfaction to people living in poverty in metropolitan areas. In addition, kaikaimanism guarantees the possibility of moving up the social ladder and protects the ability to enjoy urban facilities and get government jobs via its informal mechanisms of promotion and recognition. This is achieved by implementing reward and recognition programmes.

Neoliberalism has a significant influence on the Kaikaimanism political party, a PNG-based organization. The rise of their Christian middle class, which in turn provides financial support for the kaikai man network, has resulted from political parties' use of neoliberal policies. These projects include privatisation and deregulatory policies, among other measures. Similarly, neoliberalism guarantees that consumers will remain impoverished, reinforcing their reliance on the government for their ongoing existence. From a supportive perspective, Kaikaimanism and neoliberalism exhibit a mutually reinforcing relationship in PNG. Kaikaimanism's ideology acknowledges a spiritual aspect with Christian characteristics. In order to develop an effective network of kaikai men, it is crucial to enhance the flow of monetary incentives by using non-

material tools such as Christianity. This is essential to ensuring success in this endeavor. From the perspective of idea exchange, Christianity plays two crucial roles within the context of the kaikai men's interchange. Firstly, it acts as a cohesive force that unites classes that are often in conflict with each other within the framework of a single political party (Gulalp, 2001). Put simply, it encourages the process of bringing together different elements into a unified whole. Furthermore, it exploits the internal pressure within the group to discourage individuals from leaving the Kaikai Man Network. Ultimately, it is crucial to emphasise that kaikaimanism is based on the notion of rejecting sectarian factions rather than ethnic groups.

The underprivileged are the socioeconomic group that relies the most on kaikaimanism as a means of sustenance or to find solutions to their difficulties. This remains valid across many socioeconomic groups. In order to secure even the most fundamental human rights, those who are economically disadvantaged need assistance, or, to be more precise, rely on the benevolence of political authorities. Despite the widespread acknowledgement of poverty in PNG, the nation's clients and consumers hold divergent perspectives on the factors contributing to poverty. From a broader perspective, both the party and the provincial administration have failed to acknowledge the effective measures implemented by the PNG government to eliminate poverty. Conversely, users have highlighted the government's shortcomings in enhancing their living conditions. Provincial authorities often emphasise the significant presence of informal labour as a key element when asked about the causes of poverty. PNG's substantial proportion of informal work primarily influences the country's elevated poverty rate. There is at least one informal worker in every household. This situation is present in every single family. There are individuals who get lower compensation than they deserve, despite earning a higher amount of money in physical currency. Consequently, based on the official data, they are considered to be living in a condition of poverty. Despite the authorities acknowledging that high levels of informality are the primary factor contributing to perceived poverty, the government is reluctant to make any attempts to decrease the extent of informality. However, the government considers informality to be the primary cause of poverty. According to statistics from the PNG National Statistics Office, the unemployment rate in PNG dropped from 2.80 percent in 2022 to 2.70 percent in 2023. The population of PNG had an average unemployment rate of 2.63 percent for the years 1991 and 2023. We identified this proportion within the population. In 2021, the rate reached its highest level ever, at 3.20 percent, while in 2010, it reached its lowest level ever, at 2.00 percent.

Despite PNG's abundant resources, more than forty percent of the population lives in poverty. Throughout the Covid-19 epidemic, numerous issues consistently surfaced. The problems included government delays, poor economic management, and a health care system that suffers from serious resource deficiencies. Most people in PNG work for either private or public organisations, and their wages are slightly higher than the minimum wage. One very good example is Magabe. He has three children, and his spouse is

unemployed. Living in a small flat, he allocates fifty percent of his salary to housing expenses. Magabe is unsure how to distribute the remaining funds for his payments and needs assistance to manage his spending. Due to the tribal unrest in Hela province, he moved to Port Moresby in 2007. His cost of living has surged, despite the absence of government help. Magabe faces challenges when it comes to enrolling his children in high school. He has to pay for food and transportation expenses. He is really considering going back to his village, where he won't have to worry about rent. These testimonies clearly demonstrate that the government has failed to effectively alleviate poverty; instead, it has effectively perpetuated poverty. It mainly does this via two distinct processes. The primary issue is the occurrence of dispossession, which has been escalating due to urban transformation initiatives resulting in a significant surge in housing costs in the area. This is where the difficulty begins. Additionally, the objective is to foster a reliance on the government to maintain individuals' living standards and address the challenges they encounter.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Kaikaimanism in Papua New Guinea Public and Private Sector

Practically speaking, the public sector, which is responsible for its operation, typically views the private sector as distinct and autonomous. In PNG, a close interconnection exists between the private sector and the state. The private sectors of PNG are well-suited for patronage due to the presence of extremely diversified and large family-owned enterprises, which define their existence from a structural perspective. These companies foster patronage. The historical relevance of the connections between political leaders and business families should be emphasized. These families were able to interact with influential decision-makers due to the strong relationships they formed with the local aristocracy. Various governmental acts entrenched patronage, leading to the development of an agency structure.

In PNG's corporate environment, the agency system is a well-established practice. Keepers and government contracts directly reward and incentivize PNG merchant families for their role in serving local sources and fulfilling imported commodities or services via the agent system. The government also provides compensation and incentives to these families. Therefore, the elites of PNG have the capability to closely observe the economic advancements achieved by international corporations. At the same time, they have the capacity to carry out this task in a way that allows state elites to grant favours to specific clients with minimal oversight. Considering this perspective, it is evident that state elites play the role of intermediaries while simultaneously engaging in and expanding their own exclusive network of personal connections. During this process, local agents possess the capacity to exert influence on the investment choices made by foreign partners, potentially resulting in advantageous outcomes for the clients.

PNG merchant families' involvement in the private sector demonstrates the long-standing relationship between PNG and its ruling class. The merchant families were able to guarantee the security of their business ventures, and the political leaders were able to generate financial gains while also securing the

allegiance of their population. The PNG, with its strong economic foundation, played a crucial role in the economy by enabling merchant families to get government contracts for various projects. The historical links mentioned above have contributed to the possibility of this happening in the future. Furthermore, these transactions suggest a close connection between the business sectors of PNG and the state.

A *kaikai man* equilibrium, characterised by the exchange of employment for political support, may trap the public sector. This situation shows an inefficient allocation of resources to supporters. This balance may prevent the public sector from providing services of superior quality, or, at the very least, services that align with the public sector's operational capabilities. Multiple pieces of evidence suggest that political issues have a role in shaping the distribution of positions in the public sector. According to Calvo and Murillo (2004), the qualities of a political party's supporters are an important factor to consider when deciding if it is advantageous to exchange political support for a job in the public sector. When people who support a political party are economically disadvantaged and have lower educational attainment, it becomes more appealing to provide employment opportunities in the public sector in exchange for their political allegiance. One explanation for this is that those with lower levels of education need a decrease in the additional payment they get. Consequently, this may lead to a wider distribution of patronage. It is crucial to acknowledge the close linkage between assigning postings in the public sector as a means of granting favours and the question of determining pay in the public sector. Ultimately, we can only consider a position in the public sector as a reward if its remuneration surpasses the wages offered by other options for an equivalent workload. Only under this specific condition can we refer to a job in the public sector as a prize.

Robinson and Verdier (2013) posit that a commitment problem between voters and politicians on both sides of the issue causes this phenomenon. Voters lack the ability to pledge their vote in a specific way, and working in the public sector is a reliable, discerning, and reversible way of redistributing resources that links a voter's continued support to a politician's political achievements. Politicians, however, often choose to engage in the practice of assigning public sector positions to their followers rather than implementing income transfers. This is because the former creates income for the politician, while the latter does not. Politicians may manipulate public sector employees' careers to exert influence over them. Therefore, it is advantageous for those employed in the public sector to demonstrate their support of politicians, since the politicians may provide them with professional benefits. Alternative theories suggest that politicians may find it easier to justify their support for their followers by offering them public sector jobs, which may be said to have positive societal outcomes, rather than just giving them money (Alesina, Reza, and Easterly, 2000). People may claim that public-sector occupations provide social benefits, which explains this phenomenon.

Many theories of *kaikaimanism* suggest that it is more likely to occur when the profitability of returning to private sector activities decreases. This is because it promotes the practice of favouritism through public sector employment. Furthermore, this phenomenon is more likely to occur when the incentives for staying in power are higher and society is characterised by higher levels of inequality and fragmentation. The correlation between *kaikaimanism* and inequality arises from the impediment that inequality poses to collective action, hence making it easier to seek targeted assistance. It is plausible that this factor contributes to the higher likelihood of emerging countries, who already possess limited capabilities and lower levels of cooperation, embracing *kaikai man* policies. This is particularly true when it comes to insufficient levels of human capital and fractionalization. In such circumstances, politicians may find it difficult to establish a trustworthy pledge to implement extensive public initiatives that are hard to oversee. However, they find it easier to commit to particular benefits since they can provide them more efficiently. According to Khemani et al. (2016), an initial manifestation of *kaikaimanism* is the act of obtaining people's votes in exchange for monetary transfers. However, it is conceivable that some organisations or individuals possess more influence and backing compared to others. Politicians may become dependent on the support of certain groups, such as public sector workers, which is a form of patronage known as *kaikaimanism*. During such agreements, citizens do not expect politicians to enact comprehensive or long-term policies (as they get specific targeted benefits), while providers extract rents (as they contribute to the reelection of politicians).

Challenge to Aid a Kaikai Man Nation

PNG exemplifies a *Kaikai Man* society, so providing assistance in this country is arduous. Given other nations' historical experiences, it is possible to escape PNG's current predicament, known as the *kaikai man* trap. Thus, there is a reasonable basis to trust in this possibility. Nevertheless, there is no basis to anticipate that such a transition would occur swiftly. This is due to the lack of substantiating evidence. It is critical to modify the activities of assistance organisations to match the countries' current political and economic conditions. Regarding *Kaikai Man* polities, it is expected that providing aid would be more challenging. The study conducted in several countries (Cruz & Keefer, 2015; Wright, 2010) provides evidence that assistance is less successful in nations characterised by *kaikai man* politics. The findings we have obtained align with our viewpoint, thereby supporting our opinion. However, while these studies provide evidence that aid is less likely to be beneficial in *kaikai man* polities, their findings are relative. There is a clear difference between the expression "less likely" and the expression "never works," and when discussing typical partnerships, they are specifically referring to the usual support initiative rather than all efforts to provide help. It is important to emphasise that the results do not imply that the help delivered in PNG will be ineffective.

Although recent international research indicates that providing assistance in countries with a *kaikai man* is more challenging, this research does not specify the specific processes and mechanisms via which *kaikaimanism*

hinders the effectiveness of aid. However, PNG demonstrates a range of functional operations. One reason is that *kaikaimanism* is linked to poor governance, which hampers the ability of aid groups to efficiently allocate funds for services administered by government agencies. Donors in PNG have used aid to improve the functioning of government departments while also giving financial support for the provision of services across the nation. This has provided immediate assistance for certain situations. However, as donor participation decreases, the progress made is sometimes undermined by the incentives arising from the nations' corrupt political practices. Short-term measures cannot readily counteract the negative impact of ministers who lack interest in running their department or intentionally disrupt its operations by appointing their allies to key positions (Haque, 2012; Wood, 2015b). Decreased donor participation often diminishes the achieved improvements.

Another major problem stemming from the *kaikaimanism* phenomenon that defines PNG's political system is that politicians don't have much of a political incentive to focus on maintaining public-benefit infrastructure like roads (Dornan, 2016). The people of PNG would greatly benefit from functional infrastructure in many areas, and aiding in this endeavour would provide substantial development rewards (Dornan, 2013). Conversely, unmaintained infrastructure in PNG's tropical conditions quickly loses its value. If domestic political players lack incentives to pay for necessary maintenance, investments in this sector are likely to have little long-term impact on development. This implies that aid, which in better-governed countries could invest in infrastructure for long-term social and economic benefits, may only yield short-term gains in this endeavour.

The political climate in different nations also hinders effective assistance practices. Accords such as the Accra Agenda for Action, the Paris Declaration, and the Busan Partnership for Successful Development Cooperation have established a framework for successful assistance practices. Aligning assistance with recipient goals is a primary goal of these accords, which stress the need for cooperation between aid donors and recipient nations. (2008, OECD; 2011, OECD) Included in these treaties is the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Encouraging the receiving nation to collaborate and assume responsibility for the situation often leads to improved assistance. People often assume that the receiving country is the partner or owner, but in reality, it's the government, namely the political leaders, who are involved. Establishing fruitful partnerships and assuming control of a nation becomes challenging when the government is dysfunctional, as it is in PNG, due largely to *kaikaimanism*. *Kaikai Man* political leaders lack the political will to prioritise the country's well-being first. This lack of political will makes them unsuitable for business partners, and unlike their counterparts in more effective governments, they may not be trustworthy enough to handle financial assistance. The partnership will, therefore, face challenges (Booth, 2012).

Providing meaningful aid in the *kaikai man* circumstances of PNG is challenging due to several factors. Nevertheless, although assistance has not been capable of entirely transforming any country, it has led to substantial

progress in some crucial domains, particularly when contrasted to a hypothetical scenario in which no aid was provided (e.g., Burkot & Gilbert, 2017; Wood, 2015b). Furthermore, PNG is in great need of efficient help that can provide the necessary support. Donors face the challenge of enhancing their activities within the context of these nations. Providing detailed advice on how donors should approach this is not feasible because of the variability of best practices across different projects. This article does not cover this topic because it is outside of its scope. However, we could propose some overarching standards.

For donors to be successful in their work, they must have a comprehensive understanding of the structural elements that contribute to governance issues. Historically, the majority of assistance to the region has primarily addressed governance challenges stemming from capacity limitations. Offering scholarships, providing training in government offices, and offering technical assistance—including the deployment of professionals from donor countries to work inside government departments—have all achieved this (Hameiri et al., 2017). Organisations such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2015) and Horscroft et al. (2017) demonstrate that governance specialists employed by specific donor agencies possess a heightened understanding of the structural elements that lead to governance issues. However, a considerable amount of the aid efforts in PNG still concentrate on enhancing the country's capabilities (for particular instances, refer to Cox, Duituturaga, & Scheye, 2012; Henderson & Boneo, 2013). Yanguas and Hulme (2015) argue that this is indicative of a broader occurrence that is seen in other international development organizations. The pattern seen is that sophisticated ideas on governance often do not find expression in practical aid efforts. My explanation of the *kaikaimanism* trap highlights the difficulty of addressing structural political issues. However, even when help donors are unable to overcome governance concerns, having a thorough understanding of the elements that lead to these issues may greatly improve programs. We should selectively apply training to improve governance in *kaikai man* polities, with a primary focus on situations where capacity limitations, not political incentives, are clearly identified as the root cause of the issue. While technical assistance may often be considered more beneficial, this is not always the case due to foreign advisers' ability to effectively express their skill sets. Furthermore, external consultants who provide technical assistance may also serve as a safeguard against malicious intentions in politics. They have a favourable advantage in doing this because, as outsiders, they are less vulnerable to the impact of political pressure. Although the duration of their engagement limits their ability to do so, there is no reason why they cannot sustain such a commitment for an extended period of time.

Donors must do a pragmatic evaluation of the potential impact that assistance might achieve in the difficult conditions of PNG. Due to the very flawed state of the political environment, contributors are unable to initiate economic progress. However, assistance has the capacity to enhance human welfare even without growth, which is an additional and valuable outcome.

Furthermore, providing ongoing support may help ensure the unity and stability of institutions, enabling the countries of PNG to progress over time. Donors cannot expect to build highways in PNG and rely on local politicians to maintain them. However, donors may finance the maintenance of these roads themselves, therefore facilitating the economic benefits that roads provide. Similarly, donors lack the ability to establish completely functional health ministries. However, they could still contribute financially to significant initiatives aimed at lessening the impact of poor health (e.g., Burkot & Gilbert, 2017). If donors are ready to make continuous investments, they may act as a counterforce to political factors that would otherwise hinder electoral commissions from conducting sufficient elections.

Similarly, donors are unable to establish electoral commissions in PNG that can effectively conduct elections under difficult circumstances after foreign support has ceased. By taking this step, donors support the preservation of democracy and the creation of a lasting environment for democratic development in the medium to long term (Wood, 2015b). There is a potential ethical risk that might arise when donors become permanent fixtures in the development scene in this way. This scenario occurs when the ability of donors to provide services reduces the level of domestic expectations of governments to provide such services independently. This is a possible hazard that requires vigilant monitoring. If donors are able to reduce the degree of need, and if this leads to a decrease in the willingness of voters and members of civil society to actively participate in the political process in a positive way, it is important to reassess the concept of engagement. This danger is merely a possibility, not a certainty. As previously stated, unmet demands primarily trigger *kaikaimanism*. Consequently, it is equally plausible that as the amount of need diminishes, the level of programmatic political engagement will actually increase, leading to improved governance.

Another inevitable issue is that although certain proposed involvements would provide immediate tangible benefits, establishing certain gains (such as preventing elections from deteriorating further) will be more challenging, and the actual advantages will only accumulate over prolonged periods. This puts donor countries at risk of experiencing political fatigue. While we cannot completely avoid this risk, we can mitigate it to some extent by thoroughly educating political actors within the domestic realm. Furthermore, donors have the potential to provide support to emerging social movements that want to transform the dynamics of the nation's political economy. The donors, however, must use prudence while operating in this specific industry. Interfering in the political processes of other countries poses a significant risk. In addition, it is likely that an excessive quantity of financing, while some donor money may provide crucial assistance, might have a detrimental effect on the dynamics of organisations striving to reform systems. Moreover, funders sometimes struggle to fully comprehend the potential shifts in social progress and the people who are spearheading them. As a result, funding organizations will have a more difficult time identifying promising social movement leaders.

Despite the challenges, there is potential for progress in this area. For example, helping reformers connect with counterparts from other countries may be beneficial for exchanging ideas on how to improve the situation. Additionally, it is possible that the information might be of use to reformers. Donors may indirectly aid by being open and endorsing government openness while maintaining their own transparency. They may also continue to allocate financial resources for civil society in a broader context. In the short term, organisations within civil society are typically more efficient than the government in delivering services, even if there are no other advantages. Exercising prudence while engaging with civic society may lead to favourable outcomes. Donors should not presume that offering funding just to civil society would accelerate political transition. Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize that civil society is vital in enabling political transformation.

The condition of underdevelopment is a detrimental one, and the presence of *kaikaimanism* as both a catalyst and a consequence of underdevelopment serves as proof of this. It is quite improbable that PNG would soon forego its *kaikai man* politics for something more inclusive and progressive. Still, there's cause for optimism about the possibility of future change given the proliferation of new social movements throughout the nation. The challenge for decision-makers is to choose the most efficient approach to engaging in the interim. Given the prevailing political conditions in PNG, I have argued that in order to provide assistance that is maximally efficient, it is essential to comprehend the political dimensions of the governance challenges prevailing in the nation. Furthermore, it is critical to understand that the benefits of assistance will not persist in several regions after donor involvement has ended. Donors should provide help to PNG until they can overcome their dependency on traditional practices, known as *kaikaimanism*. However, it is important for donors to adapt their aid strategies to address these challenges.

Factors Influencing Kaikaimanism

Scholars often attribute the unique nature of politics in PNG to the similar expectations voters in the country have of politicians, mirroring their ancestors' expectations of "big men" community leaders who provided tangible benefits to their followers (Harris, 2007; Harding, 1965; Morgan, 2005). The parallels between the demands placed on influential figures in the past and the expectations placed on contemporary politicians are clearly evident. However, the idea that the historical norms of community administration directly influence current viewpoints on electoral politics remains a topic of ongoing controversy. Haque (2012) has demonstrated that rational agent models can effectively elucidate the voting choices in PNG, eliminating the need to invoke cultural legacies. Wood (2016) posits a similar viewpoint, asserting that prevailing political theories in PNG, which attribute political power to influential individuals, do not adequately account for the fact that *kaikaimanism* in the country is fundamentally the same as *kaikaimanism* in other nations without a recent history of dominant figures. Furthermore, he presents examples of voter behaviour that deviate from a paradigm where voters' inability to distinguish between modern politicians and traditional

community leaders influences their choices. These instances include voters who fail to support genuine community leaders and voters who choose to vote for individuals who are not citizens of their country. Although culture influences electoral politics in PNG (Wood, 2016), the notion that voters' past-rooted expectations lead to *kaikaimanism* lacks persuasiveness. Since this is the case, it is of the utmost importance to look for solutions that are more comprehensive.

The main conclusions drawn from the current corpus of global research indicate that countries with low levels of economic development are favourable for the emergence of populist politics (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013). Additionally, individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more inclined to vote with the aim of obtaining localised or personalised advantages (Stokes et al., 2013). This is because their immediate requirements are more severe. According to Hicken (2011), governments that lack the capacity to provide necessary public amenities and services contribute to *kaikaimanism*. The phenomenon of PNG effectively illustrates why voters in states with inadequate governance cast their votes for personal or localised benefits. Citizens in these countries have had difficulty relying on the government to adequately provide for their basic needs due to issues with governance and service delivery. Furthermore, voters have not witnessed any transformation in these domains through the enactment of policy protocols or enhanced administrative achievements following elections. Under these circumstances, it is very logical to vote with the expectation of gaining immediate, specific benefits (Haque, 2012).

Another factor that contributes to the occurrence of *kaikaimanism* in PNG is the collective action issue, which is a result of the country's weak political parties and lack of national political movements. The people choose only two out of the 111 members of parliament in PNG: the constituency representative and a provincial representative, who also holds a seat in the national parliament. Individual members of parliament (MPs) have comparatively little authority to effect substantial changes on a national scale. In programmatic democracies, political parties formed on shared interests or beliefs can circumvent this issue and provide voters with the assurance that their elected representative will collaborate with others to accomplish national-level reforms. Contrarily, voters in PNG have little confidence that their votes will bring about a transformation at the national level (Standish, 2007; Wood, 2014). The country lacks cohesive national political parties, united only by weak ties of personal loyalty and opportunism. According to Kurer (2007), the most logical and prudent choice for a voter, regardless of whether they prioritise their own interests or the well-being of others, is to vote for a candidate who will provide assistance to themselves, their family, or their community. This is due to the lack of guarantee that voters in different regions of the country have the same vision for a better nation, and there is also no guarantee that members of parliament who support reforms are really willing to collaborate.

The existence of socioeconomic inequalities provides a conducive environment for the emergence and spread of *kaikaimanism*. Ghaffar (2014) identifies four variables that influence *kaikaimanism* in PNG: low productivity and socioeconomic inequality, social and ethnic divisions, extensive state

economic policies, and a higher level of political engagement compared to the development of political institutions. In the next section, we will conduct more research into the essential components of kaikaimanism to gain a more profound understanding of interpersonal phenomena.

Low Productivity and Socioeconomic Inequalities

Kaikaimanism is a symptom of socioeconomic disparity. Singer expounded on the significance of poverty in Kaikaimanism while also highlighting other factors such as inadequate democratic institutions, limited democratic experiences, and a substantial state economic presence that facilitates redistributive transactions. Each dimension has the potential to alleviate economic shortages and address the issue of kaikai man behaviour, but it also serves to reinforce the redistributive model. Given this situation, it is crucial to examine the fundamental factors contributing to kaikaimanism.

Socioeconomic inequalities facilitate the recognition and acquisition of new clients. According to Robinson and Verdier (2003), it is more economically efficient to secure the political support of consumers who have lower incomes by offering them employment opportunities. Incumbent patrons find the practice of kaikai man re-distribution to be both attractive and effective when it comes to gaining support during elections. This is especially true if they can provide valid offers to customers, as opposed to competitors who lack credibility. Alternatively, the latter may choose to pursue policy platforms with a reduced probability of success or provide niche Kaikai Man services. Kaikaimanism's symptoms become apparent when there is a combination of social inequalities, low productivity, and poverty. This leads to additional inequalities, which in turn intensify consumers' dependence on benefactors. The redistribution of resources at the governmental level, which hinges on personal connections, demonstrates the dominance of corrupt individuals. As a result, current customers can handle economic issues without feeling pressure to adapt due to the redistribution of government staff and resources, which further strengthens productivity deficiencies. Patrons are committed to prolonging the lifespan of kaikai man systems by impeding economic change and inhibiting productivity growth.

Social and Ethnic Divides

Kaikaimanism and ethnic divisions have a strong connection. Indeed, these contrasts help kaikaimanism flourish. At the communal level, ethnicity facilitated the recognition of fundamental groupings, which in turn led to the establishment of direct patron-client ties. A consumer begins a search for potential clients within his immediate vicinity, where interpersonal relationships greatly influence the connections individuals have with one another. The expansion of a patron's resource collection resulted in an increase in his ability to redistribute, allowing him to engage with other groups and ethnicities in order to attract prospective consumers. The impact of racial disparities, which played a crucial role in early primitive social structures, declined as resources became more abundant with the establishment of the state. This happened as consumers expanded their clientele and intensified their competition for clients.

We carried out a statewide redistribution of resources, specifically focusing on the allocation of *kaikai man*, starting at the community level. Electoral competition and the availability of state resources both influenced the deepening of partiality and the encouragement of behaviours characteristic of *kaikai man*. When political competition relies on patronage arrangements, it is more probable that parties based on ethnicity will emerge. Therefore, it is likely that customers who fail to expand their customer base will persist in displaying bias towards certain ethnic groups via political competition. This would guarantee that the government retains exclusive control over resources and would also promote more racial divisions within society.

Competition for State Resources

Nations that adopt a comprehensive approach to economic management often exhibit a notable prevalence of *kaikaimanism*. To clarify, if political officeholders have the ability to directly influence the distribution of government resources, the influence of *kaikaimanism* will increase on a national scale. This theory may not be a fundamental manifestation of *kaikaimanism*; nonetheless, it does demonstrate the result and progression of the social phenomenon that arises from the use of state resources via elections.

During election campaigns, voters rely on candidates' promises and favours to assess their potential for success. *Kaikai man* voters expect incumbents they support to allocate state resources based on personal connections, which highlights the significance for both patrons and constituents in political competition. Even though some regions implemented elections after the establishment of a state, *Kaikaimaism* still emerged.

Political Participation Exceeding Development

Younger democracies tend to exhibit *kaikai man* behaviour more frequently than more developed democracies. Huntington argued that the occurrence of unforeseen democratic experiences is a result of political activity that goes beyond political institutionalization. In order to build credibility, successful democracies need political opponents to function based on policy platforms, campaign promises, and accountability to constituents. In contrast, in emerging democracies, these attributes are still in their early stages, and political adversaries may target smaller segments of voters or supporters who, in turn, may pledge their loyalty to the politician's constituents. Consequently, fledgling democracies with deficiencies in their political institutions are susceptible to *kaikaimanism*, a phenomenon that may impact policy-making procedures.

As emerging democracies progress, it is probable that political adversaries will assume the role of middlemen between benefactors and politicians. This is a result of their dependence on consumers and the possibility of allocating state resources to specific customers instead of the entire public for service delivery. Candidates in elections are compelled to seek patrons in order to create the perception of being trustworthy among voters. However, this practice ultimately leads to a diminished ability to influence legislation. Furthermore, the situation worsens the difficulties related to the establishment of political institutions, which are crucial for the progress of democratic practices where political candidates operate based on policy agendas.

Escaping the Kaikai Man Trap

The specific occurrences in PNG provide compelling proof that kaikaimanism is a contributing factor to ineffective government. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that inadequate governance plays a substantial role in causing poverty and underdevelopment. The prevalence of Kaikai Man politics can be attributed to ineffective governance and widespread poverty. When we consider these facts collectively, they point to a trap where kaikaimanism impedes national growth. Simultaneously, the underdevelopment of countries is also contributing to the perpetuation of kaikai man politics that they are now experiencing. Due to the interdependency of the two problems, neither can make any progress. Keefer (2009) closely links this type of trap to global evidence of route dependency in the quality of political governance in countries. Furthermore, it is in line with the ongoing development difficulties seen in PNG, as well as the absence of significant improvements in the nation's governance quality (World Bank, 2016a; World Bank, 2016b).

In PNG, the combination of underdevelopment and kaikai man politics suggests a bleak outlook for the country's development routes. Conversely, many nations, particularly the wealthier ones, have successfully overcome similar situations in the past. Despite the delays and incompleteness of the changes, they offer some hope that PNG may permanently overcome their current predicament. There is a small corpus of research that has focused on comprehending the political dynamics of states that have successfully resisted the impact of external forces. Insufficient evidence exists to substantiate the notion that implementing legislation to promote larger political parties, a solution often proposed in PNG, will effectively eliminate the nation's culture of patronage politics. Although PNG's kaikaimanism is linked to feeble political parties, the absence of political parties intensifies the collective action dilemma related to the country's kaikaimanism. Nevertheless, other nations with more cohesive political parties also demonstrate kaikaimanism. Gatherings often serve a vital function in the framework of kaikaimanism. To resolve the collective-action issues related to kaikaimanism in PNG, the formation of effective political parties may be essential. However, global data indicates that the presence of effective political parties is not essential for completely transcending traditional and corrupt political practices. These parties' nature and the objectives they pursue are significant.

Scholars have proposed several political theories to explain the transitions nations have undergone, shifting away from traditional kaikai man politics. Fukuyama (2014) and Shefter (1977) underscore that external dangers, particularly warfare, have instigated some changes. However, most indigenous countries, like PNG, do not face such external threats. Given this specific rationale, knowledge of this kind of transformation is not very advantageous in practical scenarios. However, some political theories propose that the nation's internal political transformation serves as the main catalyst. Because they aim to incite radical transformation, most of them rely on emerging political groups that either lack the ability to achieve their goals or have no intention of doing so

(Fukuyama, 2014; Kitschelt, 2000; Shefter, 1977). According to Abers (1998), these movements have taken shape in some nations due in large part to the emergence of issue-oriented civil society organizations that participate in organized collective action.

This specific course of action seems to be achievable in PNG. Port Moresby, along with other major cities in PNG, has seen the emergence of a politically engaged and progressive middle class (Cox, 2014). This middle class often participates in activities that are similar to social movements. The political involvement of these organizations is conceptual rather than centered on transactional demands. These movements may evolve into new political organizations that assist voters in addressing challenges associated with collective action. These actions may also encourage individuals to explore an alternative approach to politics. The likelihood of such a change occurring is uncertain, as similar shifts in other countries typically align with urbanisation and industrialization processes. Possibly, PNG may face potential obstacles, such as the inherent difficulty of achieving successful collective action, the potential co-optation of new organisations by existing political operators, and the risk of groups failing to gain momentum beyond affluent and educated urban residents. This line of action seems plausible. Undoubtedly, there is a growing fascination with programmatic politics among the developing factions.

CONCLUSIONS

Most Papua New Guinean communities see *kaikaimanism* as the foundation for establishing trust and responsibility. Politicians view *Kaikaimanism* as a platform that ensures accountability and balance in various aspects. Indeed, it establishes a connection between the oppressed and those in positions of power. Moreover, it promotes the improvement of social organisation within societal frameworks by guaranteeing the fulfillment of the esteemed objectives of both parties involved, namely the benefactor and the recipient. An essential component of political relations, its two-way character ensures that all parties involved are satisfied with the outcome. In PNG, politicians and voters work together to maximize short-term financial gains, following the *Kaikai Man* script. The integrity of government, bureaucratic processes, and the political process are all weakened by the pursuit of narrow interests. *Kaikai man* voting has remained popular due to a number of interrelated factors. The presence of an ambiguous evaluation of corruption within a political culture is the underlying factor that fuels the endorsement of specific and exclusive demands. They may be experiencing a prisoner's dilemma, but it is more likely that their behaviour is due to a lack of awareness of the negative consequences of pursuing personal gain and not considering other political options. Moreover, theoretical analysis and empirical evidence suggest that the practice of *kaikai man* voting has become even more deeply rooted due to structural factors, such as the continual breakdown of institutions. This has led to the perception that more favourable political options are unattainable. Unfortunately, the existing empirical data does not allow for an evaluation of these hypotheses. We can only hope that poll data will become accessible, providing insight into why people continue to support

politicians who prioritise personal gains over the provision of essential services. This undermines effective government and impoverishes the very people who persist in supporting these politicians.

This study explores the concept of political *kaikaimanism* and its relevance, as well as its influence on efficient government. According to the study results, the presence of political *kaikaimanism* has consistently hindered efficient government in PNG throughout the years. Consequently, the study indicates that in order to attain effective governance, promote values and ethics, and foster the creation of national wealth, it is imperative to strengthen the democratic institutions in PNG. When selecting political leaders, it is crucial to prioritise meritocracy above nepotism and patron-client relationships, which provide patrons with the power to influence the selection and appointment of leaders. We will actively support the development of a society characterised by justice, fairness, and equality. We have presented a comprehensive analysis that elucidates the detrimental impact of *kaikaimanism* on government and provides a detailed portrayal of the *kaikai man* archetype that is prevalent in PNG's political landscape. I have also examined the direct and indirect effects of poor governance and other development difficulties on *kaikaimanism*. The state of being underdeveloped is a situation that may be difficult to escape from, and the presence of *kaikaimanism* as both a contributing factor and a result of underdevelopment serves as proof of this. In the near future, it seems improbable that PNG would forsake its *kaikai man* politics in favor of an alternative strategy that fosters development. The emergence of new social forces in PNG offers optimism on the possibility of change. The challenge for decision-makers in providing assistance is to determine the most efficient way to engage in the interim. Given the prevailing political environment in PNG, I have contended that in order to deliver aid that maximises its impact, it is imperative to comprehend the political dynamics underlying the country's governance challenges. Furthermore, it is critical to understand that the benefits of assistance will not persist in many regions after donor involvement has ended. Donors should provide assistance to PNG until they can overcome their dependence on traditional practices, known as *kaikaimanism*, by adapting aid programmes to address this issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study uncovers the root cause behind the lack of democratic benefits and progress in PNG. It asserts that the failure lies with the officials who are responsible for initiating and executing developmental programmes, since they are not fulfilling their duties. This is because they have pledged their ability to take action as collateral for the individuals or organisations that funded their election campaigns, and they prioritise the interests of these funders while holding public office. Furthermore, the introduction and propagation of money politics in PNG can be attributed primarily to the emergence of *kaikaimanism* politics. Hence, to protect their autonomy from potential exploitation by financiers, we propose promoting the practice of political parties funding political candidates' election campaigns instead of relying on private

contributions. This measure would effectively thwart the financiers' attempts to gain influence over the electoral process. According to the saying, the one who provides payment has the authority to determine the course of action. This is the root cause of the current situation.

Examining the socioeconomic inequality between the affluent few and the destitute majority is crucial to avoiding uncritical allegiance. It is imperative to revise the existing structure of the Election Act of 2007 to include stringent penalties for affluent individuals who manipulate party machinery and the electoral process. Political parties must ensure that their election campaigns align completely with the philosophy they have expressed in their manifestos and agendas. Effective implementation of these proposals would liberate individuals aspiring for public office from the influence of financiers, resulting in positive outcomes and the overall advancement of the political system in PNG.

FURTHER STUDY

This research still has limitations so further research is needed related to the topic of Patronage Politics as a Failure of Governance in Papua New Guinea in order to perfect this research and increase insight for readers.

REFERENCES

- Aspinall, E (2013) When brokers betray: Clientelism, social networks and electoral politics in Indonesia. American Political Science Association Annual Conference Chicago.
- Auyero J (2001) *Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Auyero J (2012) Poor people's lives and politics: The things a political ethnographer knows (and doesn't know) after 15 years of fieldwork. *New Perspectives on Turkey* 46: 95-127.
- Betty Wakia (2024) Patronage Politics is Corrupting Papua New Guinea, *International Policy Digest* (world news), US, Available online at <https://intpolicydigest.org/patronage-politics-is-corrupting-papua-new-guinea/>
- Brusco V, Nazareno M and Stokes SC (2004) Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review* 39(2): 66-88.
- Burton, J., (1989). 'Tribal structure and rural ballot box counts in Hagen Open', in Michael Oliver (ed.), *The 1987 National Election in Papua New Guinea*, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby:253-84.
- Calvo E and Murillo MV (2004) Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentina electoral market. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 742-757.

- Cox, J. (2009). Active citizenship or passive clientelism? Accountability and development in Solomon Islands. *Development in Practice*, 19(8), 964–980. Available online at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09614520903220784> (Accessed: March 29th, 2024)
- Della Porta D. (1995) "The vicious circles of corruption," Della Porta D., Mény Y., dirs, *Democracy and corruption in Europe* , pp. 43-52, Paris, Ed. Discovery.
- Dixit A and Londregan J (1996) The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *Journal of Politics* 58(4): 1132–1155.
- Dorney, S., (1998). *The Sandline Affair: politics and mercenaries and the Bougainville crises*, ABC Books, Sydney.
- Duncan, R., & Hassall, G. (2011). How pervasive is clientelist politics in the Pacific? In R. Duncan (Ed.), *The political economy of economic reform in the Pacific* (pp. 253–263). Manila: Asian Development Bank.
- Dunleavy P (2010) Rethinking dominant party systems. In: Bogaards M and Boucek F (eds) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases and Comparisons*. London: Routledge, pp. 23–44.
- Fraenkel, J., (2004). 'Electoral engineering in Papua New Guinea: lessons from Fiji and elsewhere', *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, 19(1):122–33.
- Gelu, A., (2005). 'The failure of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties (OLIPPAC)', *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, 20(1):83–97.
- Ghaffar, M. (2014). *Clientelism Within the Arabian Gulf States and Beyond: A Comparative Study*, CEJISS.
- Gibbs, P., (2004). 'Democracy and Enga political culture', in Phillip Gibbs, Nicole Haley and Abby McLeod (eds), *Politicking and voting in the Highlands: the 2002 Papua New Guinea National Election*, SSGM Working Paper No. 1, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project. The Australian National University, Canberra:2–15.
- Gulalp H (2001) Globalization and political Islam: The social bases of Turkey's Welfare Party. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33(3): 433–448.
- Haque, TA (2012) The influence of culture on economic development in Solomon Islands: A political-economy perspective. SSGM Discussion Paper 2012(1), 1–16.

- Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14(1), 289–310. Available online at <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508> (Accessed: March 8th, 2024)
- Karatepe ID (2016) The state, Islamists, discourses, and bourgeoisie: The construction industry in Turkey. *Research and Policy on Turkey* 1(1): 46–62.
- Kurer, O. (2007). Why do Papua New Guinean voters opt for clientelism? Democracy and governance in a frail state. *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, 22(1), 39–53.
- Médard J.-F. (1976). “The customer relationship: from social phenomenon to political analysis”, *Revue française de science politique*, 26 (1), pp. 103-131. Available online at: https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsp_0035-2950_1976_num_26_1_393655 (Accessed: March 8th, 2024)
- OECD DAC (2017). OECD Stat Aid Data. Viewed 29/03/24, Available online at <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A%3e> (Accessed: March 8th, 2024)
- Pitt-Rivers J. A. (1954). *The People of the Sierra*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Reilly, B., (2002a). ‘Political engineering and party politics in Papua New Guinea’, *Party Politics*, 8(6):701–19.
- Robinson JA and Verdier T (2013) The political economy of clientelism. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 115(2): 260–291.
- Saffu, Y. (1989). Survey evidence on electoral behavior in Papua New Guinea. In M. Oliver (Ed.), *Eleksin: The 1987 national election in Papua New Guinea*, 15–36. Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea.
- Scott J. C. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Scott J.C (1972), Patron-client Politics and Political Change in South East Asia. *American Political Science Review* (66).
- Sillitoe, P., (1983). “Signs of development?” Nipa-Kutubu Open’, in D. Hegarty (ed.) *Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea. Studies on the 1977 National Elections*, University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby:196–215.

- Singer MM and Kitschelt H (2011) "Do everything" (DoE) parties: When can politicians combine clientelistic and programmatic appeals? In: Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA, 18-19 May 2011. Available online at: https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/files/2014/12/3.3.Kitschelt_Singer.pdf (Accessed 6th April 2024).
- Standish, B., (1999). 'Papua New Guinea 1999: crisis of governance', Research Paper 4, Parliament of Australia, Canberra. Available online at: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp1999-2000>
- Stokes, S. (2009). Political clientelism. In R. E. Goodin (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of political science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stokes, S., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Available online at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/brokers-voters-and-clientelism/2346382B38862E36C09042C779EA1510> (Accessed: March 8th, 2024)
- Szwarcberg M (2013) The microfoundations of political clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine case. *Latin American Research Review* 48(2): 32-54.
- Wantchekon L (2003) Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics* 55(3): 399-422.
- World Bank (2016b) *Worldwide governance indicators*, Viewed 29/03/24, Available online at www.govindicators.org