Patronage Politics as a Failure of Governance in Papua New Guinea
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59890/ijaamr.v2i11.191Keywords:
Patronage Politics, Clientelism, Governance, PNGAbstract
Papua New Guineans use the word "kaikaimanism" to characterize a political system whereby goods or services are exchanged for political backing, perhaps including an either explicit or implicit quid pro quo. It often involves behaviors driven by self-interest or the anticipation of return. The purpose of this article is to investigate the variables that contribute to the kaikaimanist approach to politics, which has such a negative influence on PNG's political and economic performance. The most likely explanation for the rise and persistence of patron-client politics is that voters are ignorant about the potential outcomes of their votes and the range of political options available to them. A further aspect that contributes to the perpetuation of this impression is the ongoing decline of institutions, such as those in charge of peace and order, which has led to the idea that better political choices are not accessible
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